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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
WILLIAM V. DAVIS, d/b/a DAVIS
ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

STANLEY L. BARRETT and IRIS
BARRETT and PERC PETERSON,
d/b/a/ TIMBERLAN SALES,
Defendants and
Respondents

Civil No.
11675

Brief of Defendant and Appellant
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
That at all times herein Plaintiff was an individual, doing business as Davis Electric
That the Defendants, Stanley L. Barrett and Iris
Barrett, were at all times the owners and reputed
owners of the real property located in Sevier County,
State of Utah.

2
That on or about the 1st day of April, 1966, the
said Defendants, Stanley L. Barrett and Iris Barrett,
did enter into a written contract with one Pere Peter:;on, dlb1 a Timberlan Sales Company, a general
:::ontractor, who subsequently did enter into a verbal
contract with the Plaintiff herein to furnish material
and labor to the premises above described for the
purpose of constructing a retail store. According to
said oral contract, Defendant Pere Peterson, dlbla
Timberlan Sales Company, would pay to the Plaintiff
the reasonable value of labor and materials furnished
for said electrical work, and the reasonable value
would be paid as billed upon completion for the I
work performed. That in addition to the oral contract I
entered into with Pere Peterson, the Plaintiff was con- )
tacted directly by Defendant Stanley L. Barrett on
or about the 1st day of April, 1966, on the job site, 1
and requested that Plaintiff provide further electrical
services consisting of labor and materials, and that
the Defendant Stanley L. Barrett did agree to pay for
said services and materials at the completion of the
work.
I

1

Between the 13th day of April, 1966, and
the 29th day of July, 1966, at the special instance
and request of the Defendants, and particularly the
Defendant Pere Peterson and the Defendants Stanley L. Barrett and Iris Barrett, the Plaintiff did per·
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form the work and furnished labor and material for
the constructlon and improvements on the premises
as described in his oral agreement, and did the additional work and provided the additional materials
as required by Defendant Stanley L. Barrett, at a
total reasonable value of $7,861.15. That Defendants
have refused to pay a balance due of $1,861.15.
A lien was timely filed and the action brought
to perfect the lien, for judgment, for principal, costs,
and attorney's fees and interest.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Lower Court granted judgment to Plaintiff
against Defendant Pere Peterson dlbl a Timberlan
Sales Company, for the sum of $1,861.15, plus interest
to date of judgment, attorney's fees in the amount
of $518.0lJ, but denied any judgment against Defendants Barrett and denied the validity of the lien.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks judgment against Defendant Stanley L. Barrett for $1,861.15, interest, costs and attorney's fees, and seeks to have his lien declared valid
as to the described property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
About April 1, 1966, Defendants Stanley L. Barrett and Iris Barrett entered into a written contract
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with Defendant Pere Peterson, dlbl a Timberlan Sales
Company (R-95) (Defendant's Exhibit D) as a general
contractor, to bui]d a building to be used for a grocery store in Salina, Utah. The written contract provided for a_ "turn-key job." Defendants Barrett understood "turn-key job" to mean that the building would
be complete in all respects and that the contractor
would hand to Barrett a key at the completion of the
building. Peterson claimed that his contract did not
include the installation of electrical connections for
certain refrigeration equipment (R-59).
Peterson employed the Plaintiff on an oral contract to do the electrical work which the Plaintiff did
according to specifications contained in the plans.
The Plaintiff was at the job site making electrical
connections on the day that the refrigeration equipment arrived and was installed by one Scott who
was one of the witnesses in this case. In order for
the equipment to be installed, it was necessary to
do some additional electrical work. Mr. Peterson
was not present. Mr. Barrett was present and claimed
that the additional electrical work was the responsibility of the contractor, Mr. Peterson. Mr. Scott of
the refrigeration company affirmed that the electrical
work was not his responsibility. The Plaintiff, William V. Davis, stated that he was employed to do
the work which was on the specifications and this
did not include the additional electrical connections
for the installation of the refrigeration equipment.
Finally, Mr. Barrett stated for Mr. Davis to go ahead
and do the wiring, in other words, to get the store
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open, a.nd if there was any discrepancy about who
was going to pay for it, he would deduct the amount
from Mr. Peterson's contract {R-46).
The Plaintiff then proceeded to do the electrical wiring work required. He has been paid the
amount of the original contract price as covered by
the specifications, but both Defendants Peterson and
Barrett have refused to pay the amount necessary to
do the extra work.
In paying the total balance due to the Plaintiff,
except the amount due on the extras, the Plaintiff
granted a lien release in the amount of $2,800.00
only (Defendant's Exhibit C and Plaintiff's Exhibit
4). The lien release there granted clearly states that
the Plaintiff was not releasing his lien with respect
to any sums due in excess of the $2,800.00.
When the Plaintiff was not paid fully for his
services, he filed with the Sevier County Recorder
a Notice of Lien under recording no. 160611 in Book
A-27, page 623 of the records of Sevier County Recorder's off1ice on September 26, 1966. The amount
of the lien was in the amount of $4,861.15. Certain
amounts were paid after the lien was filed, leaving
a balance due and owing of $1,861.15. This amount
was never paid and this action was commenced
within the one-year period allowed by law (R-1).

ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT BARRETT
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IN THE FULL AMOUNT REQUESTED AND IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN A LIEN AGAINST THE PROPERTY
OF THE DEFENDANTS BARRETT.
POINT I
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
SHOWS THAT DEFENDANT BARRETT HIMSELF
TOLD PLAINTIFF THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD BE PAID
FOR THE EXTRAS.
POINT II
DEFENDANT BARRE TT AUTHORIZED THE
EXTRAS, AND THE LIEN \VAS TIMELY FILED AND
COMPLIED WITH ALL STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
FOR VALIDITY.
POINT III
THE LIEN WAIVER SPECIFICALLY EXCEPTED
THE EXTRAS AND DOES NOT WAIVE THE LIEN FOR
ANY BALANCE NOT PAID.
POINT I

The determination of the issue under this Point
should be fairly simple, and would follow the suggestion of the Court on page 55 of the record in
which the Court states:
"It seems to me that proof can be pretty
much limited to whether or not some additional
services were performed and who agreed to
pay for them."

Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 was submitted for identification and accepted in evidence showing a list of the
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extras whkh were performed on the job. Nowhere
in the record was this list basically refuted and it
was accepted as the basis of the judgment granted
against Pere Peterson by the Court. With respect to
these extras, the Plaintiff stated on page 58 of the
record, lines 24 and 25:
By the CourtQ-You say you were called upon; by whom
were you called upon to do this extra work,
Pere or who?
A-No, Mr. Peterson was very seldom on the
job when I was there, and all the extras
that I have here were ordered by the
owner.
Q-By Mr. Barrett?
A-Yes, Sir.
Q-And did he order them of you or of your
employees?
A-He ordered them through-some of them
was ordered through an employee of mine,
but the majority of them through me personally.
Q-By Mr. Barrett?
A-Yes, Sir.

In further explanation of the itemied work on
page 60 of the record the Plaintiff stated:
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''I was ordered to work with Mr. Scott on
this, under his direction, and those were the
things that he needed by Mr. Barrett."

On page 61 of the record:
Q-Now referring again to those items opposite
"r", you stated that you were ordered by
Mr. Barrett to work with Mr. Scott and
provide for what Mr. Scott needed?
A-Yes, Sir.
Q-And did you do that?
A-Yes, Sir.

On page 62 0£ the record:
A-Well, Mr. Scott brought out that it was
definitely not part or included in his contract for the wiring and I brought out also
that it was not included on my plans or
part of my contract. And at this time Mr.
Barrett said that he would see I was taken
care of and to go ahead and do it.

On page 77 of the record, counsel for Defendant
Barrett questions Plaintiff:
Q-Y ou are claiming some contract today
against Mr. Barrett, are you not?
A-Yes, Sir-a verbal contract.

On page 88 of the record:
Q-Would you like to tell me again what Mr.
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Barrett said at the time or what was said
by the parties?
A-Well, it was Mr. Scott brought out that it
wa:'\ not his obligation or his contract to
wire these machines or the electrical portion of this, and I said it was not in my
contract either, and so it needed to be
done, and Mr. Barrett said to go ahead and
he would see that I was taken care of on it.

On page 130 of the record Mr. Scott testifies, beginning on line 15:
Q-Now could you tell me, Mr. Scott, whether
or not you had or were present at any conversation between yourself and Mr. Barrett or Mr. Davis and Mr. Barrett concerning the charges for this work necessary for
the installation of that refrigeration equipment?
A-Yes.
Q-Is it possible for you to establish when that
conservation took place if you remember?
A-To establish the exact day would be very
difficult because of the lapse of time.
Q-'With respect to when you started to do
your work, could you tell me approximately what happened?
A-I would say a conversation took place in
the early part of July at the time the fixtures were being moved into the place and
the need arose to have them all hooked up.
Q-Can you tell me who was present?

10
A-Mr. Barrett, Mr. Davis and myself.
Q-And yourself.
A-There were other workmen around, but I
don't recall them being in the conversation.
Q-Can you tell me what was said?
A-When we started moving the fixtures into
position, the fact came up, brought up by
Mr. Davis that he had nothing figured for
installing these fixtures, also the alarm
system, the heating and air-condition controls the various equipment that it took
to make a grocery store, and he of course
looked to me for payment. I told Mr. Davis
at the time that we did not include this in
my contract. I have my original proposals
that I made to Mr. Barrett and Associated
Foods Stores in my portfolio there if the
need arises to look at them, but we did not
include the electrical with my equipment,
and at that time Mr. Barrett and Bill and
myself discussed this matter from this
conversation I arrived or not arrived at,
but from the conversation.
Q-Could you tell us what the conversation
was?
A-We were talking about of course who was
going to pay for it, and I told him that I
wasn't going to pay for it. Mr. Barrett indicated that he bought a "turn-key job",
and he didn't feel that he should have to
pay for it, and at the end of the conversation Mr. Barrett stated for Mr. Davis
to go ahead and do this wiring in order, in
other words, to get the store open, and

1:
' l

then if there was a discrepancy in about
who was going to pay for it, he would
deduct that amount from Mr. Peterson's
contract. Now as much as my memory can
serve me that's the way the conversation
progressed.

The Defendant Barrett testified beginning on
page 146 of the record:
Q-About when was the first of these conversations, Mr. Barrett.
A-Probably the latter part of June, first of
July. It was just before we was getting
ready to open, and we were in a hurry, in
fact we were just a month late in getting
opened, and the equipment came in and
they wouldn't connect it up. I asked Davis
if he wouldn't connect it, and he said no,
it wasn't on the contract. I said, well it was
on somebody's contract.
Q-Who was there at the time?
A-Just I and Mr. Scott.
Q-And was Mr. Davis there, too?
A-Yes, and Mr. Davis-the three of us.
Q-All right, now go ahead and give us the conversation.
A-I said that it was on somebody's contract.
He said my contract was fully covered-all
the wiring, all the installation. Mr. Davis
had the wiring. Mr. Scott had all the installation. To my understanding that was

the complete wiring-not just partially.
Q-Now is that what you told him at the time?
A-Yes, Sir. I said I don't know who is
to pay for it, but I'm not.
Q-And did you make any other statements
about withholding money on the contract?
A-I said it would be up to Pere because he was
on the contract, and my contract called for
complete wiring.
Q-Do you recall any conversation in which you
told Mr. Davis that you would personally
assume these items he is talking about?
A-No, I did not.
Q-Then your testimony is, as I understand it,
that as a matter of fact you told him you
weren't responsible.
A-That's right.
Q-Now in the early stages of this contract, in
the planning, were you present in any meetings where the equipment and hook-up
were discussed with Mr. Peterson.
A-No.

Notwithstanding the above testimony of De·
fendant Barrett, he also testified beginning on page
151 of the record that he directed the Plaintiff to install certain pieces of equipment and to do certain
work (R-151). Defendant Barrett also admitted the
items on Exhibit 1 of Plaintiff were installed by the
Plaintiff and that Defendant Barrett received the
benefit of the installation.
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POINT II

The formal requirements of the filing of the lien
of the Plaintiff were not contested by Defendants
Barrett except to claim that a lien waiver and release had been given to the Defendant Barrett by
the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's Notice of Lien was filed
on September 26, 1966 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).
The Plaintiff himself was doing work on the
premises. The work on the job was terminated in
October, 1966 {R-64). The charges made were reasonable {R-143, line 27). In addition, no attack was made
either in the pleadings or in testimony as to the
reasonableness of the charges.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Title
38-1-3 states:
Contractors, sub-contractors and all persons
performing labor upon or furnishing materials
in the construction or alteration or addition to
or repair of any building, structures or improvement . . . shall have a lien upon the property
upon or concerning which they have rendered
service, performed labor or furnished materials
for the value of the services rendered, labor
performed or materials furnished by each, reespectively, whether at the instance of .the owner or of any other person acting as his agent,
(emphasis ours) contractors or otherwise.

Within the meaning of the statute, the Plaintiff
is entitled to file a lien. Under Title 38-1-7, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and under Title

38-1-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, all
of the requirements of Law as to filing and initiating
foreclosures were honored and complied with.
POINT III

The Defendants Barrett rely heavily upon a purported lien release designated a_s Defendant's Exhibit C and Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. It is not necessary
to go deeply into this purported line waiver as on
its face it shows that it does not waive any liens
except for the amount of labor and material as per
contract only. Since the amount which has not been
paid and for which this action was brought was for
extras beyond the contract, this lien waiver is not
applicable. In the 5th line the Plaintiff specifically
states that the waiver is "for electrical labor and
materials on new building as per contract only.''
Plaintiff also states "Payment is not received for
extra work performed and materials furnished in ad·
dition to contracted labor and materials." (Emphasis
ours.)
Then in the middle of the paragraph below, in
addition to other things, the Plaintiff states that he
grants a waiver for the contract price of $2,800.00
only. Then in order to clarify he states: "I hereby
specifically reserve any and all rights I may have
or may be entitled to under and by virtue of the
mechanics and materials lien laws of the State of
Utah by reason of extra labor performed and materials furnished by me to said property or in connec-

,

1
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tion, over and above the said contract price of
$2,800.00. It is also testified to on page 72 of the record
in a discussion between the Court and counsel in
which the Court recognises in lines 12, 13 and 14:
"Of course the conditional release apparently
would indicate there was $2,800.00 due and said
nothing about the $1,861.15."

On page 107 of the record, lines 15, 16 and 17,
discussion of the $2,800.00 payment was conducted
and questions propounded of Mr. Pere Peterson:
Q-Now there was an additional $2,800.00 payment that was testified to. Could you tell
me whether that was also a payment to be
credited to you or was that a payment of
Mr. Barrett's?
A-It was credited to my total contract.
Q-Could you tell me whether or not that was
a payment on the $6,000.00 contract?
A-Yes, it was.
Q-Can you tell me whether or not that was a
payment on extras?
A-That was not.

It follows that if in fact extras on the contract
were ordered by the Defendant Barrett, the purported lien release and waiver waives nothing beyond those items contained in the original contract,
and shows no credit as against the amount claimed
to be due by the Plaintiff.
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CONCLUSION
In the amended decision of the Lower Court, the
Court quotes testimony by Scott, and the Court
states:
" ... the only theory under which the Plaintiff
can
a claim against Barrett is on some
oral promise. The testimony of the witness Scott
is the most persuasive concerning this matter ...
(Scott: In other words to get the store opened,
and then if there was a discrepancy on about
who was going to pay for it, he would deduct
that amount from Peterson's contract . . . ) It
negatives any promise to pay on the part of
Barrett."

It seems to us that Scott's testimony shows just
what the Court says it does not show: that Barrett
promised to pay.

The issues before this Court are very simple
questions of fact:
1. If Davis did the work for Peterson as a subcontractor under Peterson's "turn-key job", then
Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against Peterson
and a lien against the property.
2. If Davis did the work at the direction of
Barrett or the promise of Barrett that he would pay,
Davis is entitled to a judgment against Barrett and
a lien against the property.
Notwithstanding the dispute as to the interpreta·
tion of the "turn key" contract between Defendants
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Barret and Peterson, the Plaintiff did the work on
the premises as part of the job. The work he did
was extra and he is entitled to a judgment and to
a lien on the property.
tion.

There is no testimony to sustain any other posiRespectfully submitted,
LORIN N. PACE
HARRIS, RUNYAN & PACE
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants
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